



YOUTH  
CITIZENS  
OBSERVERS  
NETWORK

الشبكة الشبابية للمراقبة المدنية

# الحرب في السودان - ما بعد سقوط مدني

## The War in Sudan - After the Fall of Madani



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## Contents

Executive Summary:.....	2
About:.....	3
Introduction and Prelude:.....	3
Political Developments After the Fall: .....	3
Rapid Support Forces (RSF):.....	3
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): .....	4
Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum): .....	5
Emergency and Resistance Committees:.....	5
Arming Citizens and the Entry of the Ethnic Dimension into the Conflict:.....	6
Indiscriminate attacks on civilians: .....	6
Extrajudicial Killings and Massacres: .....	7
Forced Displacement and Destruction of Homes:.....	7
Destruction of Property and Infrastructure: .....	8
Humanitarian Aid and Health System: .....	8
Economic Situation: .....	9
Recommendations: .....	10
Annex: .....	11

## Executive Summary

1. **Background:** The Youth Citizen Observers Network (YCON), concerned with documenting violations during the war in Sudan and supporting democratic transformation, highlights the impact of the fall of Madani City on the political, social, and economic situation in the country.
2. **Political and Security Developments:** Systematic violations by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and a restrained response from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) increased ethnic and racial tensions. The efforts of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum) to stop the war have not been significantly fruitful.
3. **Social Conditions:** Citizens are being armed on an ethnic basis, random attacks and serious violations against civilians are occurring, including extrajudicial killings and forced displacement.
4. **Economic and Humanitarian Impacts:** Disruption of main supply lines and their negative impact on trade and the economy, in addition to the collapse of the health system and problems in distributing humanitarian aid.
5. **Recommendations:**
  - a. Sudan desperately needs full and immediate implementation of its peace agreements.
  - b. Sudan's civilians desperately need the belligerent parties to respect political and civil rights.
  - c. All Sudanese need the unification of political and civilian efforts to stop the war.
  - d. International pressure is needed to achieve a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and provide protection and support for civilians and displaced persons.

## About

The Youth Citizen Observers Network (YCON) includes grassroots youth organizations spread across all localities of Sudan, working to support democratic transition in Sudan. The network dedicates its efforts to amplifying the voice of youth and increasing their influence in various political processes within Sudan to achieve the goals of the Glorious December Revolution. Following the outbreak of the current war, we in the YCON decided to observe the various violations that occur during the war and their consequences, in addition to documenting migration and displacement movements, human rights conditions, and various efforts to stop the war. The YCON has observers spread across all states of Sudan, working on the ground for monitoring and surveillance. These observers send initial reports from the field, which form the basis of the network's various reports and activities.

## Introduction and Prelude

The scope of the war that started April 15, 2023, increases daily. Civilian casualties are rising, whether through killing, displacement, or systematic impoverishment through looting and stealing citizens' properties. This report attempts to reflect the latest military and security developments that have cast their shadows on the political, social, and economic levels. This report is based on the consequences of the fall of Gezira State and its capital, Madani. The fall of Madani was a pivotal point that has influenced the course of other events and has had repercussions on citizens, including massive displacement and refuge. The fall of Madani has also instilled fear in the residents of states that were not previously within the war zone.

## Political Developments After the Fall

Rapid Support Forces (RSF):

The leader of the RSF, Lieutenant General Hemedti, appeared in a regional tour targeting African decision-making centers and some influential African countries. His goal was to rebuild trust and polish his image after the invasion of Madani city, which in itself is considered a war crime. This attack caused displacement and uprooting of

citizens who were already displaced from Khartoum and other states fleeing the horrors of war. The RSF committed systematic violations against civilians of Madani, including rape, looting and stealing money and cars, and evicting citizens from their homes. Unarmed civilians were killed in many villages of Gazira state, including Arbaji and Al-Mai'liq, to name a few. The actions of the RSF leader abroad, wearing civilian clothing and playing the role of a peace promoter and guardian of democratic transition, are contrary to the reality of his forces' actions on the ground.

#### The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF):

Upon RSF's advancement, SAF's First Infantry Division commander withdrew from Madani City. The army's actions since then have shown a turn against civilians rather than the RSF. This included declaring a state of emergency in all states under its control, restricting political activities, silencing voices calling for stopping the war through arrests, and even dissolving service committees and emergency committees that play an important role in initiatives for housing displaced people. Campaigns to mobilize and arm civilians based on ethnic grounds increased, introducing a new factor in the war. Racial tensions are increasing, such as in the city of Dalanj, where the conflict is between Arab tribe members in the RSF and Nuba members in the SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). Incitement campaigns and the stirring up of sentiments from the highest political levels in some states, such as the Nile River State, where the governor's speech indicated the arrest of young men working in the Land port and marginal jobs.

Regarding regional politics, the lack of unified political decision-making within SAF is clear. The efforts and movements of the army's commander, Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, are in one direction, while statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in another, as seen in the recent IGAD summit. Despite Al-Burhan's attendance at the summit, the Foreign Ministry's statement opposed its outcomes. The isolation of the army's leadership is also evident in its attempts to find allies from the former regime, whether in the army chief's trip to Tehran, yesterday's ally, or the planned trip of the Minister of Finance, Jibril Ibrahim, to Moscow.

### Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum):

In their efforts to stop the war, the leadership of Taqaddum appeared in two meetings, one with the President of IGAD, Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti, and the other with the commander of the RSF, Hemeti. An agreement titled 'Addis Ababa Declaration' was signed, which included the following main points:

- a) The RSF pledged to open safe passages in their controlled areas and provide necessary guarantees to facilitate the work of civil action organizations and protect relief workers.
- b) The release of 451 war prisoners and detainees through the Red Cross Committee.
- c) Preparing the atmosphere for citizens to return to their homes in war-affected areas.

However, as of writing these lines, none of the agreement clauses have been implemented. On the other hand, it is clear there is no agreement between Taqaddum and the Emergency Committees, as shown by the statements of the Resistance Committees (RCs) refusing to sit with Taqaddum, indicating some active forces' rejection of Taqaddum's movements. Despite the regional moves made by Taqaddum, they lack initiatives and a strong drive to unite the internal political forces, especially the young revolutionary powers.

### Emergency and Resistance Committees:

The young revolutionary force exhibits energy and enthusiasm but lacks the mechanisms and capacity to move to a higher level of organization and planning, the levers and tools that enable them to compete with seasoned political forces and personalities in political action. This force is divided between a segment that supports the SAF in their war against the RSF and another segment that calls for stopping the war and sitting at the negotiation table.

## Arming Citizens and the Entry of the Ethnic Dimension into the Conflict

Both parties to the conflict are arming tribes and citizens with different motives and under other names in their controlled areas. What the RRSF calls a 'Fazaa' is termed 'mobilization and rallying' by the SAF. The Armed Forces carry out mobilization and rallying in areas under their control, as is happening in the states of River Nile, Northern, Kassala, Gedaref, Red Sea, and Blue Nile, attracting civilians with motives of protecting honor and property. Governors of the states and executive directors in the localities have assigned special committees for the mobilization and arming of citizens. Mosques have also been made centers for the registration of those mobilized, and various pulpits have been exploited for rallying and mobilization.

Similarly, the RSF in South Darfur, Nyala, was seen opening a recruitment office in the local Beida market, where young people eager to enlist were registered amid significant monetary incentives, replacing the random mobilization and rallying.

The arming operations are based on ethnic and tribal grounds, which portends the transformation of the war into a civil war. The developments that occurred in the city of Deleng and statements from some members of the two forces are just the beginning of the ethnicization of the conflict.

The transformation of the conflict into a comprehensive civil war means the situation will become uncontrollable, and it will be difficult to achieve a ceasefire and engage in negotiations to end the war. The civil war will also create alternative and multiple decision-making centers, which will make the situation even more complicated.

### Indiscriminate attacks on civilians

As we anticipated from the beginning of the war, it would not be limited to Khartoum state only. With the war exceeding 200 days, new states and cities entered the war zone. The entire Darfur region has become a conflict zone, alongside the three states of Kordofan (North, South, and West Kordofan), Khartoum, and Gezira, and now the war is on the outskirts of Sennar and White Nile states.

With the expansion of the war, violations against unarmed civilians have increased. The army's air strikes on populated areas caused civilian deaths and destruction of citizens' property, not to mention the destruction of infrastructure, as happened in the Riyadh neighborhood in Nyala and continuously in the three cities of Khartoum.

On the other hand, the RSF continues to launch mortar shells and anti-aircraft in the cities of Khartoum, causing deaths and injuries among civilians and increasing the looting and robbery of citizens' properties wherever they enter.

Both parties to the conflict violate humanitarian law and the protection of civilians during the conflict, and these violations are considered war crimes and crimes against humanity par excellence.

### **Extrajudicial Killings and Massacres**

Extrajudicial killings and physical eliminations continue, where the SAF have executed about 150 citizens in the Gezira state accused of collaborating with the RRSF. Similarly, the RSF is killing and eliminating Nuba people in Khartoum, accusing them of belonging to the armed forces. All these eliminations are carried out on an ethnic basis.

### **Forced Displacement and Destruction of Homes**

Gezira state is one of the states most affected by the internal displacement of those fleeing the horrors of war, predominantly from Khartoum state. With the clashes that erupted last December in the state, field teams estimate that more than 509,796 people have been displaced due to the recent escalation of fighting throughout Gezira state. While reports indicate that 205,460 displaced people sought safer locations within Gezira, more than 304,336 displaced people fled Gezira and reached Sennar, White Nile, Al Qadarif, Kassala, Red Sea, River Nile, and the northern states. The International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix also indicates that about 224,000 displaced people have undergone secondary displacement, in addition to 275,796 newly displaced people from Gezira state. According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix of the International Organization for Migration, the



potential expansion of the conflict in the south and east is likely to lead to secondary displacement as people seek refuge in safer countries.

The RRSF committed violations, including forced displacement of citizens and forcibly taking over their homes in areas under their control.

## **Destruction of Property and Infrastructure**

December witnessed the continued destruction of the remaining infrastructure, where the RSF bombed the remaining warehouses at the Al Jili refinery, and the Central Bank of Sudan branch in Gezira and the Sahel and Sahara Bank tower in Al Mugran area in Khartoum were burned. The aerial bombardment carried out by the army exposed citizens' homes to destruction, as happened in Nyala and the Salama area in Khartoum, also resulting in civilian deaths.

## **Humanitarian Aid and Health System**

Wad Madani city contains comparatively well-equipped hospitals compared to the health situation in Sudan post-war. However, following the attack by the RSF on the town, most hospitals were put out of service, exacerbating an already deteriorating health situation into a more catastrophic state.

With the RSF control over the state, the World Food Program (WFP) reported thefts from its warehouses, resulting in the loss of supplies sufficient for one million people for a full month. This led to the departure of many organizations working in humanitarian aid in the state, further complicating the distribution of humanitarian assistance, which had already been hindered earlier by both sides of the conflict.

The delivery of humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons, whose number exceeds 7 million according to statistics, has been continually obstructed by both sides of the conflict. The RSF has been hindering the arrival of aid from the East to the states of Kordofan and Darfur, while the Sudanese government has been mismanaging some of the aid by selling it or distributing it to undeserving recipients (refer to the previous report 'In-depth Report on the Reality of War in Sudan')

## Economic Situation

The economic impacts have become clearer and more disastrous after the fall of the Gezira state. One of the main supply lines for food and petroleum to the major states of the Kordofan region was disrupted. This supply line, which previously moved goods from Madani through the White Nile state (Al Dueim city) to North Kordofan, has now been completely halted. The stoppage of this line resulted in a rise in the prices of basic commodities. Just two days after the seizure of the city of Wad Madani, the price of a sack of sugar in North Kordofan increased from 85,000 SDG to 105,000 SDG, while in West Kordofan state, it reached 180,000 SDG.

Furthermore, the fall of Gezira state instilled fear among traders and institutions that had relocated from war-torn states to Wad Madani to continue their operations. Consequently, trade activity significantly decreased, leading to substantial losses for many traders and factories. Some institutions refrained from purchasing their requirements, and a portion decided to close their offices in Sudan, leading to economic stagnation and contraction.

The rise in fuel prices led to increased production costs for small industries and higher transportation costs, which in turn increased the cost of locally produced goods, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products in other regions. The fluctuating disbursement of state employee salaries remained a persistent issue during the war and continues to impact many families whose breadwinners work in government offices.

## Recommendations

1. Rapid Support Forces: Implement the agreements made in the Addis Ababa declaration.
2. Sudanese Armed Forces: Respect political and civil rights and cease the repression and arbitrary arrests of civilians.
3. Taqaddum: Apply the same effort made in regional movements internally to unify political forces and attract young forces to stop the war.
4. Resistance and Emergency Committees: Move from reactive to proactive roles, including in peace efforts.
5. Both Conflict Parties: Cease indiscriminate bombing that leads to civilian casualties and damage.
6. International Community: Pressure both parties to enter into an unconditional cessation of hostilities, leading to a definitive end to the war.
7. Protection for Civilians and Displaced: Work with international organizations to ensure the protection of civilians and provide basic needs for the displaced, including security, shelter, food, and healthcare.
8. Call for an Immediate Ceasefire: Work with the international community to impose an immediate, internationally monitored ceasefire to stop violence against civilians.
9. Legal Assistance and Psychological Support: Establish centers to provide legal and psychological support for victims and survivors of violations.
10. Documentation of Violations and Crimes: Form specialized teams to document violations and crimes committed during the conflict for use in future trials and to ensure accountability.

## Annex

The Annex table below illustrates some developments in the displacement process following the fall of Gezira State and the escalating events in the Greater Kordofan region.

Region	State	Key Developments in the Displacement Process
Khartoum	Khartoum State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Continued displacement from conflict areas to safe areas, in addition to routine displacement outside the state.</li> </ul>
Greater Darfur	South Darfur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Refugee movement towards Libya and South Sudan continues.</li> <li>- Internal displacement towards safer states in search of better living conditions.</li> </ul>
	North Darfur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The report of the General Coordination spokesperson for displacement camps indicates a famine threat to thousands of displaced after an 8-month suspension of WFP services.</li> <li>- State of terror due to shelling on the Alsalam Camp in December, leading to injuries and deaths</li> <li>- Displaced in Tinah locality, numbering (6,000), struggled to access basic needs without support from humanitarian organizations and were relocated to the Tulum refugee camp.</li> <li>- About 15,000 war escapees arrived at the Zamzam camp from other states and were hosted in homes of previous displaced.</li> </ul>
	West Darfur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased refuge to Chad after events in Kharaf and violations by RSF and their militias in North Geneina.</li> <li>- Forced marriage of girls by RSF and militias.</li> <li>- Complex health and economic conditions and absence of humanitarian aid.</li> </ul>

	East Darfur	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military intelligence of the 6th Division prevents relocation of relief materials for displaced and affected by the war in El Daein city.</li> </ul>
Greater Kordofan	North Kordofan State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large displacement of citizens from West El Obeid to Um Rawaba locality due to violence, spread of weapons, and organized crime.</li> <li>- Most shelters are emptied due to lack of food and security.</li> <li>- Some displaced returned to their homes in El Obeid.</li> <li>- Recorded numbers of displaced in different areas of North Kordofan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 81,132 families and 92,487 individuals in the city.</li> <li>• 3,712 families and 22,722 individuals in Sharkila.</li> <li>• 3,390 families and 26,340 individuals in Wad Ashana.</li> <li>• 9,372 families and 56,232 individuals in Central Um Rawaba.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	South Kordofan State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Significant displacement due to military and civil conflicts, with the number of displaced from Khartoum to Qadir locality being 92 families and 423 individuals.</li> <li>- Displacement due to the Popular Movement in Um Halib village with 4 families and 25 individuals.</li> <li>- Displacement due to the civil war between the Kawahla and Hawazma to 55 families and 439 individuals, the entire village of Habob burned down, and displacement from inside Abu Nqid village with 25 families, according to Social Welfare and Commission statistics.</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited internal displacement outside Deleng city towards adjacent mountainous areas, especially west and southwest of Deleng, close to areas controlled by the Popular Movement and its military administration in Jald.</li> <li>- Part of the displaced returned to Deleng city; others remained out due to fear of renewed attacks by RSF.</li> </ul>
Greater Gezira Region	Gezira State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increase in displacement due to fighting and the fall of Wad Madani.</li> </ul>
	Sennar State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increase in number of displaced from Wad Madani and significant displacement movement from Sennar to other states.</li> </ul>
	White Nile State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased displacement rate after the recent clash in the Jabal Awliya area, contributing to overcrowding in shelters, leading to difficulties in accessing urgent health and food services, especially for women and children.</li> </ul>
	Blue Nile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reception of a large number of displaced from Gezira State, with the opening of shelters in Damazin.</li> </ul>
Eastern Region	Al Qadarif State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Displacement conditions in the state worsen due to the departure of many organizations.</li> <li>- Displacement of citizens from some villages of Fao to Al Qadarif municipality following clashes between the army and Rapid Support Forces at the state border with Gezira State.</li> <li>- Entry of over 30,000 displaced into the state after events in Wad Madani.</li> </ul>
	Kassala State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Significant increase in displacement due to conflicts in Wad Madani, with Kassala Emergency Room registering about 86 new shelters after war displaced from Gezira State.</li> </ul>

	Red Sea State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Continued plight of displaced, especially with authorities' refusal to allocate some schools for shelter, arguing they are for training the mobilized.</li> </ul>
Northern Region	Northern State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large displacement from Darfur and Kordofan to El Dabba city.</li> <li>- Displaced lack shelter and sleep outdoors.</li> <li>- Migration towards Egypt and Libya in search of better conditions.</li> <li>- In Wadi Halfa, approximately 10,156 were displaced in 53 shelters.</li> </ul>
	Nile River State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Overcrowding in shelters after the fall of Wad Madani and many fleeing across the southern border to Egypt for fear of RSF.</li> <li>- Amidst this overcrowding, the displaced suffer from a lack of food and essential services despite efforts of organizations and emergency rooms in the state.</li> </ul>