



YOUTH
CITIZENS
OBSERVERS
NETWORK

الشبكة الشبابية للمراقبة المدنية

أكثر من 200 يوم من الحرب

More than 200 Days of War

تقرير متعمق عن واقع الحرب في السودان
In-depth Report on the realities of Sudan War



YCON.SUDAN

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About the Youth Citizen Observer Network (YCON)

We are a group of Sudanese youth active in many civil society organizations and resistance committees across Sudan and interested in civilian monitoring and peacebuilding. We have formed a network, the Youth Citizen Observer Network (YCON), whose primary goal is to support the democratic transition in Sudan by activating the role of youth locally. Our vision is to build a transparent social democracy through civilian oversight and promote the principle of good governance in Sudan.

Our mission is to empower youth to be the foundation and guarantee for building a democracy that achieves freedom, peace, and justice in Sudan.

When the war began in Sudan, the network became a platform to monitor Sudan's political, security, and humanitarian situation. The network always seeks to document violations and call for peace and the establishment of democracy.

We were able to compile and issue many periodic and specialized reports through our presence in the field in all Sudanese states. In addition, we always strive to convey the voice of Sudanese youth who reject war and always and forever call for peace in a free, democratic, and just Sudan.

The network is working hard to raise the voice of Sudanese youth as a pivotal force on the path to democratic transformation and building a more comprehensive and just society that respects human rights and ensures the general well-being of the Sudanese people.

Executive summary

Seven months after the start of the two generals' absurd war in Sudan, seven months later, the shooter of the first bullet is still intentionally missing. A war that had direct repercussions, including the killing and displacement of millions of Sudanese. The most dangerous are the indirect repercussions, the effects of which will continue long after the guns, cannons, and drones have fallen silent.

For seven months, the Youth Citizen Observer Network followed up and documented violations by the primary and secondary parties in the conflict. The network's observers monitored the truces, which, of course, were not respected. The monitoring team also followed up on the political, economic, health, and refugee conditions on all Sudanese lands despite all the field and political challenges facing all network members.

Sudan is a naturally rich country, making it vulnerable to many ambitions from those near and far and to internal and external enemies.

Sudan, a vast and diverse country in northeastern Africa, has been plagued by conflicts throughout its post-independence history. The recent outbreak of hostilities, which began in April 2023, is a complex and multifaceted conflict with roots in long-standing political, ethnic, and economic grievances. The fighting has already had a devastating impact on the Sudanese people, causing widespread displacement, loss of life, and human rights violations. Prospects for peace remain uncertain, but several factors could lead to resolving the conflict.

Sudan gained independence from joint British-Egyptian rule in 1956, but its subsequent history has been marked by instability and conflict. Two civil wars between the northern and southern regions of the country resulted in the deaths of more than two million people and the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The conflict in Darfur, which began in 2003, also caused widespread death and displacement. Military governments have also ruled Sudan throughout most of its history, and there have been numerous coups and coup attempts.

The roots of the current conflict can be traced back to the quest to control Sudan's resources, whether its primary location as a link between the Red Sea and Central Africa or the natural resources that were, for a long time, the monopoly of the corrupt political class that ruled modern Sudan. As for fueling the conflict, it has many factors, including the economic, political, and social marginalization that the regions on the outskirts of Sudan suffer from, especially the border regions to the west and south, in addition to factional marginalization based on ethnic and tribal backgrounds and political marginalization based on preserving the club of traditional politicians and political parties that have proven. Repeatedly, it has been unable to lead Sudan to the path of serious democratic transformation.

All of these conflicts that have constituted and continue to constitute a severe threat to the future of the Sudanese people have been taken advantage of by some international and regional players in a way that suits their agenda and plans. Some weak-minded political and military parties in Sudan have created an incubating environment for preferring personal interests over the interests of Sudan and the people.

The war in Sudan is having a devastating impact on the country's civilian population. More than 5.2 million people have been internally displaced to date, and more than 1.3 million have fled to neighboring countries as refugees. The conflict also caused widespread loss of life, with estimates ranging from 9,000 to 10,000 people. Women and children were particularly

vulnerable to the effects of war, in addition to widespread human rights violations, including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings.

The war in Sudan has had a significant impact on the surrounding region, destabilizing neighboring countries such as South Sudan, Chad, and Uganda. The conflict has also attracted the international community's attention, with the African Union, the United Nations, and the United States playing a role in mediation efforts. However, the international community has been criticized for its lack of effective measures to prevent conflict and alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people.

Prospects for peace in Sudan remain uncertain. There are several challenges to achieving lasting peace, including deep divisions between the parties involved, a lack of trust between them, and the continued presence of armed groups in the country. However, there are also some positive signs, such as the willingness of both sides to engage in dialogue, which should be managed to serve the benefit of the people and not just a maneuver from the conflicting parties, who deep down are not interested in ending the conflict, in addition to a growing international pressure to resolve the conflict.

In addition, there is the fragmentation of the civilian political parties and the inability to convince the Sudanese people, first, and the international community, second, of their ability to lead Sudan to safety.

The war in Sudan is a complex and multifaceted conflict with a long and tragic history. The fighting has had a devastating impact on the country's civilian population, and prospects for peace remain uncertain. However, several factors could lead to resolving the conflict, and the international community has a crucial role in supporting efforts to bring peace to Sudan.

The following is a report in which the Youth Citizen Observer Network attempted to analyze and place all the monitoring operations it has carried out at the disposal of local and international public opinion, hoping that it will be a positive step towards Sudan's progress toward peace and democracy.

introduction

The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which began in April 2023, is a complex and multifaceted issue rooted in a long history of political instability and ethnic tensions. At the heart of the conflict lies a power struggle between two rival factions in the Military coup government: the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

Origins of conflict

The seeds of the current conflict were sown in 2019 when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a popular uprising. Following this, a transitional government was formed to lead Sudan towards democracy. However, this process was derailed in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the Sudanese Armed Forces commander, staged a military coup, dissolved the transitional government, and seized power.

The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, two powerful military groups, have long been at loggerheads, each vying for control of Sudan's economic resources and political influence. The Rapid Support Forces, led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, is a paramilitary group that emerged from the Janjaweed militia, a force accused of committing widespread atrocities during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s.

On the other hand, the Sudanese Armed Forces is the traditional Sudanese army with a long history of involvement in Sudan's political affairs. The two groups have clashed on several occasions since the fall of Al-Bashir, and the 2023 conflict is the culmination of these tensions.

Some of the military tensions that preceded the outbreak of the first spark of the senseless war in April 2023 may give an idea of the reality of the fundamental conflict, which is a struggle over economic resources and political influence only:

- **October 2022:** The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed in the eastern Sudanese city of Kassala over control of a gold mine. The battles continued for several days and resulted in dozens of casualties.
- **November 2022:** The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces exchanged heavy fire in El Fasher in northern Sudan. The fighting broke out due to a dispute over the deployment of the Rapid Support Forces in the region.
- **December 2022:** The RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed again in Kassala over water well control. The fighting caused several casualties and raised fears of a broader conflict.
- **January 2023:** The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces engaged in a tense confrontation in the capital, Khartoum, over control of the presidential palace. The conflict continued for several days and raised fears of a coup attempt.
- **February 2023:** The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces clashed in the Belil locality in South Darfur over control of oil fields. The fighting led to several casualties and disrupted oil production in the region.

- **April 2023:** The deployment of the Rapid Support Forces in the vicinity of Merowe Airport in northern Sudan constituted a dangerous turning point in the relationship between the Sudanese military forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

These field military events embody the ever-lasting political conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. The differences between the armed forces and the Rapid Support regarding the political future of Sudan are very significant. Still, they agree on one opinion, which is to disrupt any political initiative or process that seeks to transform Sudan into a fair democracy in which human rights are respected and which serves the Sudanese riots.

The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have different visions for Sudan's future. The Sudanese Armed Forces prefer a more traditional army-led government, while the Rapid Support Forces prefer a more populist and authoritarian approach led by Dagalo.

In the stage that preceded the war and in the first days of the war, Dagalo tried to portray the Rapid Support as a force fighting for freedom, seeking to correct the course of the democratic transition process and hand over power to a civilian government. He was able to some extent to convince some civilian forces of this, but nature quickly prevailed, as the forces Its affiliates suffered grave violations during the war, including targeting on the ethnic and tribal levels, plundering and occupying civilian homes and property, destroying markets and looting shops, besieging and targeting refugee camps in the Darfur region, occupying health facilities and hospitals, kidnapping and using sexual violence against Sudanese women, recruiting children, in addition to facilitate the work of gangs and seek to regulate the work of gangs instead of deterring them. The following is an overview of the Rapid Support violations and their actions outside any form of ethical and humanitarian controls:

- Recruiting children as young as 16 years old to participate in delivering vehicles loaded with stolen goods from Khartoum to El Daein - East Darfur. Field reports indicate that sums of money ranging between \$1,500 and \$5,000 were given to about 700 young men between the ages of 16 and 19 to go to Khartoum and return with vehicles loaded with money and stolen goods.
- Recruiting young people by using either enticement through financial gains or intimidation, as young people join the Rapid Support as a means of protection to spare themselves and their families from robbery, looting, and the occupation of their homes.
- After the increase in the number of uncontrolled weapons in East Darfur, the Rapid Support Command sought to organize the work of gangs in this state, and it succeeded

to some extent in imposing de facto authority, which reflected a false positive about security for the residents of this state.

- Targeting those fleeing from West Darfur state towards the Chadian border by shooting directly at them, which is an ethnic targeting par excellence given the fliers belonging to the Masalit tribe.
- Destroying all government facilities and the headquarters of national and international non-governmental organizations in areas under RSF control.
- Destroying all markets and destroying all goods and property wherever they go.
- The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abkar, was assassinated, and the accused assassin, Tahir Karshoum, installed himself as a de facto governor due to his ability to impose his control by force of fire, which gave citizens a false sense of security.
- Subjugating citizens in the states of Central and South Darfur and refugee camps by force of siege, preventing aid from reaching the refugee camps and localities, in addition to destroying water, electricity, and communications stations to subjugate them.
- More than 50 cases of women and girls, especially in the Darfur region, being subjected to horrific acts of sexual and gender-based violence. Members of the Rapid Support Forces use sexual violence as a method of war to instill fear and assert control over local communities.

The behavior of the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Al-Burhan, during the war is no better than that of the Rapid Support. The Sudanese army leadership uses proxy war through a mechanism of random recruitment and arming of tribes in the various Sudanese states, in addition to relying on new militias, such as the Al-Baraa Battalion and the Special Action Forces, which operate outside the legal framework that governs the Sudanese Armed Forces, which represents a repetition of the historical mistake, which is Establishing the Rapid Support Forces, which brought us to where we are.

In addition, the security apparatus and military intelligence are repressive agencies that restrict all civil and political activists in the states under their control. This is an overview of the repercussions of the wrong strategy of the armed forces:

- Military Intelligence opened recruitment camps in multiple localities and sought to include and arm young people affected by Rapid Support. These young men seeking security fought alongside the armed forces above all else. The armed forces did not return the favor by withdrawing from all the states of Darfur without informing these young people of this and leaving them to face their fate with rapid support that did not

hesitate to carry out genocidal operations and force those They surrendered to bury alive those of their arrested comrades.

- The use of financial incentives by the armed forces for mobilized youth represents a factor that attracts young people, especially in light of the deteriorating economic situation throughout Sudan (incentivizing fresh graduates with an amount of 6 million Sudanese pounds and an amount of 2 million Sudanese pounds for the training division). Still, the financial incentive turns the mobilized from soldiers of the homeland to mercenaries.
- Graduating batches of recruits within a short period not exceeding a month from the start of military courses in the states of Gedaref, Kassala, and the Red Sea. Al Jazeera and the White Nile prove that the recruitment process has one goal: to use young people as fuel in battles without equipping them properly.
- Some of the direct effects of the random recruitment process are the reports monitored by observers of robbery cases carried out by members of the armed forces in the states of Gezira, Sennar, and White Nile. It is worth noting that it is a phenomenon that began in the period that followed the graduation of batches of recruits.
- The failure of the armed forces to protect civilians in more than one place and incident. Below are some examples.
 - Lack of army presence inside Umm Rawaba, Al Rahad, and Bara in North Kordofan state to protect citizens from RSF violations.
 - The army did not intervene when the Rapid Support forces attacked refugee camps in the Darfur region, even though these violations occurred close to the army forces' position, specifically the 6th Infantry Division.
 - The rapid support forces roam safely between Khartoum - Omdurman and Al-Uqla - White Nile locality without any deterrent from the army air force.

The Sudanese war and international law

International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of war or the laws of armed conflict, is a body of rules that seeks to limit the effects of armed conflicts and protect the life, health, and dignity of those who are not combatants in the war or who are no longer participating in the fighting, such as civilians and the wounded. The sick and prisoners of war.

The basic principles of international humanitarian law are:

- **Humanity:** This principle requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to direct their attacks only against combatants and military objectives. It also prohibits the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate harm.
- **Necessity:** This principle requires parties to a conflict to use only the minimum force necessary to achieve their military objectives. It is prohibited to use unnecessary violence or cause unnecessary suffering.
- **Discrimination:** This principle requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians and to attack combatants only. Targeting civilians is prohibited as a matter of policy or practice.
- **Proportionality:** This principle requires parties to a conflict to balance the military advantage gained from an attack with the expected harm to civilians. An attack is not proportional if the expected damage to civilians is excessive compared to the expected tangible and direct military advantage.

These principles are reflected in several international treaties and agreements, including the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. International humanitarian law is binding on all states and armed groups, regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant treaties.

Some specific humanitarian rules that warring parties must abide by during war include:

- **Restrict degrading treatment or punishment:** This rule prohibits the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering on any person, whether directly or indirectly.
- **Protection of Prisoners of War:** Prisoners of war must be treated humanely and must not be subjected to violence, intimidation, or reprisals. They must have adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, and medical care.
- **Protection of civilians:** Civilians must not be deliberately attacked or harmed. They must be protected from the dangers of armed conflict, including indiscriminate attacks, collective punishment, and the use of human shields.
- **Providing humanitarian assistance:** Parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unhindered passage of humanitarian relief to civilians in need.
- **Respect medical teams, facilities, and means of transportation:** Medical teams, facilities, and means of transport must be respected and protected. They may not be attacked or used as targets for military action.
- **Prohibition of certain weapons:** The use of certain weapons, such as chemical weapons, biological weapons, and cluster munitions, is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

Together, let us review the field observation during the war to know the extent to which the warring parties did not adhere to international law principles.

Indiscriminate attacks on civilians

A defining feature of the conflict has been the indiscriminate targeting of civilians by both sides. These attacks took the form of air strikes, shelling, and ground attacks on residential areas, hospitals, and schools. The most horrific examples are the July 2023 air strike on the market in El Fasher, North Darfur, which killed at least 40 people, and the indiscriminate bombing in Omdurman, which in September claimed more than 150 civilian casualties, including children. The massacre that claimed the lives of 45 civilians was renewed in an air strike in November 2023 on the famous market in Omdurman.

Repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilians turns it from random to intentional. The scorched earth policy followed by both parties in the areas under their artillery control and raids is claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians and is a described crime against humanity.

Extrajudicial killings and massacres

The conflict has seen a horrific surge in extrajudicial killings and massacres. Army forces summarily executed civilians accused of collaborating with the Rapid Support in various areas of Khartoum State, often based solely on their perceived political affiliations. In one of the most horrific incidents, the El Geneina massacre in July 2023, the Rapid Support Forces slaughtered more than 87 Masalit civilians, leaving behind a series of bodies scattered in the streets, in addition to carrying out revenge operations against civilians supporting the army forces in Ardamta locality - West Darfur. In November 2023, it is worth noting that the qualifiers were mainly based on ethnic affiliations.

The spread of sexual violence

Women and girls have been disproportionately affected by conflict, bearing the brunt of sexual violence. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have been implicated in systematic rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual assault against women and girls. These atrocities left the victims with profound physical and psychological scars.

It is not easy to document all cases of sexual violence and rape that occurred during the war period for multiple reasons, the most important of which is the conservative nature of Sudanese society, in addition to social legacies that make the victim of sexual violence feel ashamed, disgraced, and at times guilty, and all of this in the absence of any form of support, whether inside or outside Sudan. Outside in countries of asylum.

Sources and stories of sexual violence varied, but they converged on the following:

- The Rapid Support Forces that entered Khartoum shortly after the start of the confrontations committed mass rape while looting and robbing residential areas.
- The forces supporting the Sudanese army (Aqar forces) that entered Khartoum were practicing the same types of sexual violence.
- In the beginning, sexual violence focused on foreign females (Ethiopian women, South Sudanese women, Eritrea...), but discrimination soon disappeared, and all women became vulnerable to systematic sexual violence.
- Women faced sexual violence at all stages: while in their homes, during escape, and many cases of sexual harassment were observed at centers and checkpoints. Survivors faced sexual blackmail at border crossings by smugglers, militias, and border forces.
- Increasing the number of underage marriages, as families believe that this issue can restore the dignity of women who have been subjected to sexual violence.

Although the Sudanese Penal Code stipulates the right of pregnant women as a result of the crime of rape to undergo a legal abortion (Article 135 of the Sudanese Penal Code of 1991), it neglects the authority authorized to issue this permission, in addition to the fact that the procedures required in the absence of medical and administrative staff can be long and drawn out, for a long time, which increases the burden on the victims. It is worth noting that the Public Prosecution Office in Wad Madani recently issued a decision allowing 21 of the victims to undergo a legal abortion.

Collecting reports on gender-based violence is very complex in Sudanese society, which is considered a subject that must be worked on at all levels, education, and societal culture before addressing the legal aspects.

Forced displacement and destruction of homes

The conflict sparked a large-scale displacement crisis, with approximately 6,400,000 people forced to flee their homes due to fighting and fear of violence. About 1,200,000 left Sudan for

neighboring countries, and 5,200,000 took refuge in “relatively” safer areas inside Sudan. Many have taken refuge in overcrowded camps or informal settlements, where they face dire conditions and limited access to essential services. According to recent reports by the United Nations, the number of Sudanese in need of assistance is estimated at 24 million and 700 thousand people, representing an increase of 56% over the year 2022, that is, before the war.

It is worth noting that internal asylum and the involuntary return of families to the states constitute a fundamental challenge, not only for the refugees themselves but also for the host communities, as they are not qualified in terms of services or infrastructure to receive this number of people.

Despite the development in the past two months, local authorities and civil administrations remain confused regarding managing the crisis without emergency plans. The fate of the Sudanese citizens remains dependent on individual initiatives and the determination of the host communities, and everyone knows that this form of dealing is unsustainable with the crisis.

Destruction of property and infrastructure

The fighting caused widespread destruction of property and infrastructure, including homes, schools, hospitals, and agricultural fields. This devastation has severely disrupted livelihoods and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. In addition to targeting bridges and waterways. Bombing the Shambat Bridge and the Khazzan Bridge in Jabal Al-Awliya and targeting the road between Khartoum and Kordofan, all in a desperate attempt to cut off the supply route for rapid support, as if the one who is targeting these roads and bridges does not know Sudan and knows very well that this ill-considered targeting has no benefit. On the contrary, it has an effect. The long-term cost of reconstruction does not justify the destruction, especially since it did not lead to any benefit.

As for the attacks by the Rapid Support, they are deliberate operations to attack and destroy all components of the Sudanese economy. An example of this is the attack on oil refineries - the attack and control of the Al-Jili refinery, which tightened control over 70% of fuel supplies and targeted the Balila oil field and airport, which led to the cessation of production.

In addition, Rapid Support prevented the engineering teams from reaching the electricity and communications companies in all Kordofan states and Darfur and Khartoum, which put these states in a state of darkness and the inability to produce except by the Rapid Support plans.

Obstructing humanitarian aid

Deliberate obstruction by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has hampered the delivery of humanitarian aid to affected areas. These obstacles have hampered efforts to provide those in need with food, water, medical care, and other essential supplies.

The Rapid Support Forces rely on military tactics based on long-term siege and surprise attacks. The effectiveness of this tactic has been proven in the states of East, South, Central, and West Darfur, where it was able to besiege and eliminate the Sudanese army forces present in these areas, which made it impose its control over these states ultimately. This victory The military bill was mainly paid by the residents of these states, as the complete siege of the states, the prevention of aid access, and the targeting of water tankers led to the deterioration of the living and health conditions of the residents of the states and the refugees in the camps, especially the Hasa Hais camp, the local camps of Tawila and Kutum, and the camps of Balil and Kalima.

As for the role of the army in obstructing the arrival of food aid, there has been and is nothing wrong with corruption in dealing with the distribution of aid to those who do not deserve it, selling aid on the black market, and using aid as bribes for those on call and their families.

The military plans for rapid support and the lack of a plan by the Sudanese army led to depriving the needy Sudanese people of access to the most necessities of living based primarily on aid.

The political situation in Sudan

The Youth Citizen Observer Network conducted a questionnaire that included approximately 900 young men and women active in the public and political fields. However, this questionnaire gives indications of the orientation of Sudanese youth. It is not necessarily a correct representative sample (this questionnaire was done based on what is available at the current stage and in light of the pressures of war In Sudan); the results have implications that help analyze the attitudes of Sudanese youth.

In addition, the reports of experts and field observers indicate that the war in Sudan has entered a new and dangerous phase, which is the phase of “normalization of the war”:

Normalizing war means making war seem like a “normal” part of life. It is a set of linguistic, rhetorical, and cultural tools used to obscure the abnormal character of the war by turning it

into an event that is seen as “normal.” Normalizing the war is what the leadership of the Sudanese army and the authorities are trying to do by asking schools to reinstate the curriculum. We see that successive governors are interested in secondary matters under the guise of improving the lives of citizens. At the same time, they are distracted from essential issues such as dealing with disease pests (dengue fever and cholera) and problems resulting from war (refugees, unemployment, and the destruction of the economy).

Local and international media have contributed to this. News about the war in Sudan, if any, is included in negotiations and political speeches, in addition to turning victims and martyrs into nothing more than numbers, and does not show importance to the impact of the war on Sudanese society.

The strategy of normalizing the war followed by the conflicting powers is evidence of the lack of an actual intention to end the war and make the negotiations successful.

The normalization of war may lead to an increase in the population’s optimistic views, as evidenced by the rise in the number of promising youth from 42.9% to 54.7%, which is a higher number than the percentage of youth optimism before the war, which was approximately 52%, it is essential to note that the impact of the war on people’s outlook it can be complex and can vary depending on the specific circumstances. Optimism can increase in times of war, as people may feel a sense of unity and purpose in the face of adversity. However, it is also possible that the normalization of war leads to desensitization to violence, trauma, and the continuation of cycles of violence. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the potential impacts of normalizing war on individuals and societies and work to create a more peaceful and stable future for all.

At the international level, the current situation in Sudan is a state of habituation, and it is part of the normalization of war, which is one of the direct effects of the prolonged war. Denunciations and denouncing acts of violence have turned into receptions for one of the parties to the war in international forums. It is worth noting that the guest of these forums is one of the leaders of the military coup against the democratic transformation. In partnership with yesterday’s ally and today’s opponent, the other party to the conflict. The international community is not playing the expected role, and the evidence for this is that 79.7% of Sudanese youth evaluate the international community’s role as weak and very bad. If this indicates anything, it is either that the international community is not doing its part to end the war or that the efforts he is making are insufficient from the point of view of Sudanese youth.

Al-Burhan's recent visit to the United Nations challenged the revolution and the process of democratic transition in Sudan. The reception of the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court for Al-Burhan as a representative of Sudan was a slap in the face to the Sudanese people, who suffer daily from the repercussions of the senseless war that began in 2023, carried out by the leaders of the 2021 coup against the quasi-government. The legitimacy established after the glorious 2019 revolution led to the overthrow of the Bashir regime.

The recent United Nations session in New York appeared as an implicit acknowledgment of the fait accompli that the leaders of the military coup against civilian rule have become representatives of the Sudanese state. We reaffirm that the period of war and the continuous aggressions by the conflicting parties have proven that neither of them is neither qualified nor trusted to lead Sudan toward safety.

The other matter is that despite the infringements and violations of all human rights and the repeated violations of international law that have occurred and are continuing by the parties to the conflict, the prosecutor of the International Court meets with one of the parties to this conflict. While replacing the meeting with an investigation or at least an interrogation could have been more suitable.

Adopting a resolution by the United Nations Human Rights Council to establish an independent international fact-finding mission regarding the situation in Sudan is an insufficient initial step. This mission consists of 3 people to cover Sudan with its 18 states and 189 localities on a land area equivalent to one million and 886 thousand square kilometers.

33% of active Sudanese youth are not aware of the establishment of this committee. As for those who are aware of this decision, they fear its inability to work (48.7% of them believe that this committee is unable to collect field evidence and stress the importance of cooperation with networks and organizations that monitor The reality on the ground, while only 31.3% believe that it can work, while 20% believe that the authorities will not cooperate or allow it to work). Still, the greatest fear is that this committee will be a formality that will meet and not decide.

Al-Burhan and his aides from the remnants of the former regime could impose their desire on the United Nations. They stopped the work of the agreement related to UNITAMS. They were able to set the replacement of the representative of the Secretary-General with another diplomat, even though he is known for his long experience in managing crises and conflicts. Still, the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the leader. The international campaign in 2009 not to prosecute Al-Bashir before the International Criminal

Court is once again a mockery of the Sudanese people and youth who gave dearly and cheaply to get rid of Al-Bashir's regime.

As for the American and European sanctions on the leaders of the Rapid Support and the institutions affiliated with the army are insufficient and do not relieve hunger. Sanctions on visas and financial transfers, as if the combatants are following the legal frameworks by obtaining money and military support, and that the parallel black economy they have built over the past years will not be affected by international sanctions, and the evidence is visible. The intensity of the clashes did not decrease. On the contrary, the Rapid Support Forces carried out mass massacres in Darfur, and the intensity of the bombing and air strikes from the Sudanese army in Kordofan intensified. All of this happened in the post-sanctions period.

Returning to the internal political scene, the Sudanese parties and politicians are entirely separated from the field reality in a surreal scene repeating before the war. They meet and decide on joint initiatives. They talk among themselves, decide among themselves, and agree among themselves. The same faces that before the war could not work to unify The Civil Front resurfaced in the post-war era, with more than six civil initiatives to stop the war, each with its apparent agenda that did not differ from the other. Still, inside, they were fronts struggling for power.

60% of Sudanese youth believe that the civil movement to stop the war, in its current form, is weak, dispersed, and needs to unite, while 15% of active youth have no idea about this movement, and only 24.5% see it as good and must continue. These results, if they indicate anything, indicate that those responsible for these initiatives are repeating past mistakes by not being comprehensive and transparent and will not be able to reach a solution.

Young people aware of the collective initiatives, the most recent of which took place in Addis Ababa - Ethiopia, are not sure of the ability of the gatherings to influence the conflicting parties to end the war (only 26.5% of them believe in the ability of the "Taqadum" platform to have a positive impact towards stopping the war, while 44.9% are sure of the inability and 28.6% are not confident). This indicates to the curators of the "Taqadum" platform the necessity of explaining their initiatives and goals to the Sudanese youth and people, not just to each other or the international community.

Young people are still not optimistic about the roles played by political parties and armed movements, whether they signed the Juba Agreement or did not sign (only 9.5% of young people positively evaluate the role of the movements that marked the Juba Agreement, while 13.3% thoroughly assessing the role of the movements that did not sign the Juba Agreements),

even though Young people do not see the positive role of the armed movements. Still, the difference in their assessment of the role of the signed movements from the non-signatory movements, with a more significant positive role for the non-signatory movements, indicates that reconsidering the Juba Agreement remains necessary in the next stage.

Sudanese youth still believe negotiations are the best way out of the crisis, despite their doubts that negotiations in their current form can have positive outcomes, as 83.4% of youth support the resumption of negotiations in Jeddah. Still, only 57.2% of them are optimistic about the success of the negotiations.

Negotiations between the two conflicting parties must be limited to a ceasefire, the opening of humanitarian corridors, the conduct of independent talks, and an expanded political dialogue to reach the best solution for the return of long-term stability. Civil society must participate at all stages and be empowered and charged with monitoring the implementation of agreements.

With the continuation and length of the war and the unwillingness of the conflicting parties to reach a solution. Indeed, according to the field reading, the conflicting parties seek to divide Sudan into two or more states, with repeated threats to declare rival governments by both parties. The Youth Network for Civilian Observation stresses the importance of Sudan's unity and insists that Sudan's strength is in its diversity.

Conclusions

The Sudanese political scene is complex in appearance and straightforward in content. By reviewing field reports, the following can be concluded:

- The international community is interested in the situation in Sudan but not enough to put pressure to take the peace initiative to the highest level, in addition to relying entirely on regional initiatives, even though the political complications and extensions extend beyond the region's borders.
- The two conflicting parties, yesterday's allies/today's opponents, are not severely interested in finding a solution to the conflict, as they feed from the ongoing conflict, especially if their actions go unchecked or accountable.
- Traditional political parties that are not trusted by Sudanese society are trying to repeat the solutions of the past over and over despite their proven failure.
- Civil forces with multiple initiatives.

- Active and enthusiastic Sudanese youth, but unable to move to the higher level of organization and planning, in addition to the absence of the necessary technology to combat parties and experienced figures.
- Many international and regional players, each interested in its agenda.
- The remnants of the previous regime are ready to take Sudan to hell to regain control, and to achieve this, they are hiding behind the army and local authorities.

At first glance, the scene seems bleak, but it is solvable if the actual intention is found. The most important thing is to start prioritizing:

- 1. A serious and complete effort to stop the war and mobile clashes as quickly as possible despite the will of the conflicting parties because each of them is trying to gain as much as possible before sitting at the negotiating table.**

Reaching the implementation of this point is not easy and faces challenges, the most important of which are:

Rapid Support seeks to completely close down the Darfur region, believing that it is its incubating environment without taking into consideration that the majority in the area are non-Arab tribes not loyal to it, so it seeks to silence them by displacing them and committing ethnic massacres. He will also seek later, as his field commanders said, to find a seaport to ensure the supply line's continuation. Its first goal is to reach the Red Sea through war or alliances with tribes and de facto forces in the eastern states, which will enable it to connect the Red Sea to the Sudanese interior and its African extension. But he may be satisfied with reaching the Mediterranean through Libyan alliances. As a precautionary plan, he seeks to control the city of El Fasher with its airport equipped to receive large transport aircraft.

In addition, Rapid Support is trying to expand southward, and the conflict is raging. The siege of El Obeid in Kordofan is the best evidence of this. This military strategy characterizes the Rapid Support (long siege, restrictions, and surprise attack).

As for the Sudanese army, in a state of constant reaction, it is floundering internally due to the multiple sources of internal power (the general command, the remnants of the former regime, the intelligence leadership and the security apparatus, field commanders, in addition to the advocacy forces operating outside the legal framework). The historical mistake of rapid support emptied the army of infantry forces capable of controlling the battlefield. The army leadership was content with complete control of the air force and artillery, which are weapons that cannot resolve the battle and impose a field reality, and when used inside cities (urban warfare), cause more harm to civilians. Of the military, as proven by field reports.

Rapid Support responds by occupying homes, bridges, and health infrastructure in the hope of sheltering civilians and using them as human shields. However, the recent bombing of the Shambat Bridge and the Jabal Al-Awliya Reservoir Bridge is an indication that the army may indicate the rules of engagement, which increases the fear that the bombing will develop and affect civilian hospitals and homes extensively if there is suspicion of the presence of civilians—rapid support elements.

Despite the above, a ceasefire is still possible, provided we acknowledge the bitter reality - both parties are implementing external agendas - and communicate and negotiate with external parties (regional and international) supporting and delivering supplies to both parties.

2. The second phase - after the ceasefire

Immediately after the unconditional ceasefire, we must begin calling for an open national dialogue that includes all Sudanese political and social components (the historical parties, the forces of freedom and change, the signed and non-signatory armed movements, the elements of the civil government, the civil political forces, the tribes, and regional forces, civil society and most importantly the youth. The resistance and emergency committees represent the Sudanese as a primary partner.

This dialogue requires technical and material support and unconditional essential technical support for the components because bringing the youth to the negotiating table without real support will not do the negotiations justice, and the youth's participation will turn into an adornment to soften the political scene only.

3. The third stage - the institutional building process

The primary specialized committees must be formed to put Sudan on the right track within the framework of the democratic transformation process. The technical committees consist of experts and Sudanese figures who do not aspire to political positions and do not wish to assume executive or representative positions - considering the spectrum of societal and regional groups. In addition, they Determine a logical timeline for completing initial drafts of their work.

The most prominent of these committees:

- Constitutional and Legal Committee
- Transitional Justice Committee
- Administrative and Military Reform Committee

- The State Affairs Steering Committee (or the so-called transitional government with limited powers)

Economic situation

It is painful to remind and shed light on the dire and unprecedented economic situation. Sudanese are exposed to famine in a land of abundant natural resources. The war left more than 24 million citizens in need of assistance to continue living.

The best evidence is the military strategy of rapid support, based on siege and encirclement before attacking and controlling (El Geneina - Zalingei - El Obeid - Khartoum). It is contrasted with the Sudanese military strategy based on indiscriminate bombing, cutting off supply routes, and scorched earth. These strategies have increased the suffering of the Sudanese people because their results are a complete closure of the ports that may be used to deliver aid, which constitutes collective punishment and is a crime for which international law is accountable.

Administrative corruption in the distribution of aid led to trading and selling foreign aid goods and prevented it from reaching those who deserved it, which exacerbated the situation. To maintain control and spread corruption, the security forces pressured the emergency committees to take control of the shelter centers in the eastern states, Gezzira State, and Sennar. This pressure led to the closure of some of these centers, while the security agencies are still restricting the centers that continue to provide support to the displaced and citizens.

Due to the government's inability to manage the crisis, it used foreign aid as bribery and for political benefit, as aid was distributed to nepotists and used to pay the dues of government employees who had not received their salaries since the start of the war.

As for the wrong financial policies followed by the government, which led to a frightening increase in the exchange rate, the Sudanese will live with the repercussions of these destructive policies for a long time, specifically the end of the war and the increasing demand for hard currency in light of a destroyed economy.

The Sudanese productive economy before the war was under the control of one of the two conflicting parties (extractive industries, factories, import and export, and mines), which made it a direct target when the war broke out, as the Rapid Support systematically targeted the industrial facilities of the Sudanese army and vice versa.

As for those who pay the direct and indirect price, it is none other than the Sudanese people.

Placing vital and economic facilities under the control of armed forces will lead to inevitable destruction when any problem erupts, let alone if it is a war. But this destruction will not harm the conflicting parties who depend on military and financial aid from external countries or the parallel black market. Still, it will cause long-term harm to Sudanese civilians.

The war showed the fragility of the centralization of the Sudanese economy. At the beginning of the war, which was initially confined to the capital, Khartoum, whose area does not exceed 5% of Sudan, the entire Sudanese economy collapsed, and work was paralyzed in all Sudanese states. This is due to the centralization of the decision in the capital and the marginalization of the role of other states. The most prominent example of this is the Sudanese banking system, which relies mainly on the centralization of decision-making in the capital for all operating banks, in addition to the centralization of the clearing house in the capital, the cessation of which led to a complete cessation of banking work and transfers. Seven months after the start of the war, the clearing house is still not working, and the banks are working partially. Without returning regularity to banking work, there is no way to relieve citizens of the burden or recover the economy, even partly.

Centralization of public and central markets in Khartoum - all exports pass through Khartoum, and all imports pass through Khartoum.

The inability to reach Khartoum, either due to clashes or because the roads leading to it were targeted, led to the disruption of the entire economic wheel in all Sudanese states, including the Sudanese agricultural sector.

The extension of the conflict to the agricultural states led to the inability of farmers to access crops, which led to recession and corruption.

Eager to preserve agricultural resources in their control areas, armed movements entered the war to protect their food security. Some of these movements entered the war alone, for example, the Sudanese Liberation Army forces, which fought battles with both sides of the conflict. Others allied with the main parties to the conflict, such as South Darfur's armed forces and the eastern states' Beja forces.

There has been no famine in Sudan until now due to the entry of low-priced foodstuffs from neighboring countries (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and Chad) into the Sudanese market.

These materials were not present in the markets before the war, which indicates that Sudan was living in isolation from its surroundings due to the concentration of commercial activity

in Khartoum, which gave the capital's merchants the upper hand in monopolizing materials and setting prices.

They were targeting refineries and oil fields, which led to a scarcity of electricity, water, and transportation fuel. This led to the interruption of essential services in most states for long periods extending to months.

The scarcity of fuel also led to the inability to move and transport the necessary materials from the agricultural states or border crossings to the consuming states, specifically the states considered host communities for the displaced, which directly led to a significant price increase. This scarcity has also greatly affected the communications sector and the ability to pump water to hospitals and homes.

The inability of citizens to access clean water led to an increase in the spread of infectious diseases (cholera, dengue fever, malaria...), which exacerbated the outbreak by the amount of internal displacement to areas that are not equipped to accommodate this number of people.

The lack of adequate infrastructure in the states is the result of the lax policies of successive governments, the lack of equitable development between the states, and the concentration of services in the capital, Khartoum, which confirms that the war on the Sudanese people preceded the firing of the first bullet.

State authorities and civil administrations

The war proved that there were no emergency plans at any level, despite everything we heard before and during the war about meetings, preparations, and crisis and emergency management plans. The war revealed the falsity of these allegations and that they were mere words if they existed.

In the first months of the war, Sudan witnessed a state of confusion at the state and local levels due to their inability to deal with the displaced and those returning to their states. The success rate in dealing with juveniles varied based on individual initiative, as youth resistance committees and emergency committees turned into beehives, opened shelter centers, and relied on separate sources to secure the necessary resources to meet the needs of the displaced.

Some local administrations were highly cooperative, others backed off, and others sought help from the security services to seize shelters and began closing the shelters that were providing psychological support and activities aimed at alleviating the trauma on children.

Health system

The collapse of the health system in all states is due to several reasons, including:

- Centralization of health services in Khartoum and their weakness in the regions
- Continuing power outages in hospitals
- Interruption of medical supplies
- Occupying medical centers and hospitals
- Repeated assault on medical staff
- Lack of access to clean water
- Overcrowding resulting from displacement and increased demand for medicines and medical supplies.
- A large number of medical teams resorted to neighboring countries
- Military operations continue in the Khartoum Region, Darfur Region, and Kordofan Region
- Inability to access financial resources due to non-payment of salaries, loss of small traders, industrialists, and farmers of their sources of livelihood, and paralysis of the banking sector.
- Lack of emergency plans and crisis management plans at all levels
- Failure of governors and local authorities to make the necessary decisions to limit the spread of infectious diseases

All of the above made the survivors of fire, gunpowder, and mass massacres face their fate with disease, epidemics, and disease.

The citizen's slogan was: If you do not die from bullets, you will die from another -

Schooling system

In an ill-considered step, the decision was taken to restart the academic year. Despite the importance of this decision, it remains inapplicable, or at least ineffective, if basic measures do not accompany it:

- Finding alternative shelters for displaced people
- Paying the salaries and dues of professors and teachers (it is worth noting that one of the professors was arrested when demanding teachers' salaries in May and is still detained)
- Control of epidemics and infectious diseases
- Providing electricity to schools and homes, even for intermittent periods

If these basics are not met, this decision becomes a rightful demand intended to be false—this random decision aimed to normalize the war and not return students to school.

Arrests

The army forces and the Rapid Support Forces, each in areas under their control, are trying to silence the voices denouncing the war and demanding its cessation by directing the ready-made accusation of (dealing with the enemy). It is worth noting that most of the detainees are young activists who stood up to the two generals in the past.

In addition, any social, cultural, or political activity that seeks to create a safe space to think about how to get out of the spiral of conflict is stopped, which constitutes evidence of the Sudanese army's fear and rapid support of the power of thinking and the ability of youth to change.

The arrests and sometimes assassination threats against civil and political activists are conclusive evidence that both parties do not respect the other's opinion, which makes them not authorized to lead or even be part of the political process and democratic transformation.

Recommendations

The war will not stop by stopping the guns, cannons, planes, and marches. Instead, the battle toward a free, independent, democratic Sudan begins when the war ends, and the current battle must be limited to stopping the fights.

The Sudanese administrative structure needs amendment and serious work to build a sustainable economy based on parallel development in all Sudanese states.

Work on developing emergency and crisis management plans - provided they are not limited to military conflicts but also target the spread of epidemics and natural disasters.

Work to empower local communities, especially young people - because they are the least vulnerable to corruption.

Work to expand political agreements and economic and development plans to include local communities, as the war proved that public policies were designed to serve a specific group of favored people and courtiers and did not consider the needs of the Sudanese people.